

## **The Holocaust in the Netherlands and the Rate of Jewish Survival**

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**One central question in Dutch historiography is why such a high percentage of Jews from the Netherlands died in the Holocaust. In this article, a recent dissertation on the rate of survival of Jews in the Netherlands is mobilized to shed light on the discussion of the low survival rate there. Wide variations in survival rates throughout the country call into question easy explanations for the overall (low) rate. In particular, the greater success of the Sicherheitspolizei in hunting down hidden Jews in certain parts of the country calls for more attention.**

For scholars of the Holocaust, the low survival rate of the Jews from the Netherlands remains a mystery. Of the 140,000 people (native and immigrant) whom the Nazis considered “full” Jews in 1941, only 27 percent survived the occupation. Yet in Belgium, 60 percent of the approximately 66,000 Jews survived, and in France, 75 percent of the approximately 320,000 Jews escaped death at the hands of the Nazis. Given the comparative weakness of antisemitism in the Netherlands, how can this remarkably low survival rate be explained? Scholars have offered varied and sometimes contradictory explanations. In recent years, several have tried to summarize the state of the debate.<sup>1</sup>

To explain the national differences in survival rate, historians distinguish between the roles of the German perpetrators, the Dutch bureaucracy, and the Dutch population at large, and those of the victims. By pointing out some of the particularities of the Dutch case, scholars have sketched the beginning of an explanation. Unfortunately, historians have not thoroughly tested their hypotheses. Pim Griffioen and Ron Zeller employ a more analytical approach than most historians, and thus are able to eliminate some hypotheses. But even they, in my opinion, do not test, adequately or at all, the explanations that have been put forward.

Peter Tammes and I have sought to put the testing of hypotheses at the heart of our work.<sup>2</sup> Although the research for our dissertation focused on explaining the variation in the rate of survival of Jews within the Netherlands, the results have major implications for possible explanations of the relatively low survival rate of Jews in that country overall. More fundamentally, the finding that this rate systematically varied with individual, local, and regional characteristics raises questions for historians researching national differences. A focus on aggregate national percentages minimizes

individual, local, and regional differences. In that way, certain significant parts of the explanation receive too little attention while insignificant parts receive too much. In our dissertation Tammes and I show how to go about systematically studying and comparing within-country variation. Our methods could (and ought to) be used for comparison among countries as well.

In this article I first present the main hypotheses of Johan Cornelis Hendrik Blom and Bob Moore, and the contributions of Pim Griffioen and Ron Zeller. Then I explain how Tammes and I determined which of the Jews in the Netherlands did survive the persecution and which did not. I briefly present the major findings of this study on individual, local, and regional patterns in the survival rate. Next I discuss the implications of these results for the way historians study national differences in survival rates. Finally, I consider some matters that are neglected in historiography but that add to the explanation of why only a small number of Jews from the Netherlands survived.

### **Historiography and the Jewish Victimization Rate in the Netherlands**

Blom

To explain the low survival rate, Blom<sup>3</sup> distinguishes between the persecutors, the “setting” (bureaucracy, population, geography), and the victims. Blom stresses the role of the German civilian administration that Hitler granted the Dutch in 1940 as a “Germanic” people. This administration was ideologically and organizationally very purposeful. In its ranks the SS and Nazi Party had a strong presence, in contrast to the countries under military administration such as France and Belgium. Moreover, four out of five of the leading functionaries were not just Nazis but Austrian Nazis, prone to especially strong antisemitic convictions. These officials always showed a unity of purpose when it came to persecuting the Jews, despite the internal conflicts that generally characterized National Socialist rule. According to Blom, such harmony did not prevail in France and Belgium, where the relative unwillingness of the Wehrmacht to play its part in the persecution led to many problems and delays in its execution.<sup>4</sup>

To explain the “success” of the persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands, Blom considers the country’s geography and the role of the Dutch bureaucracy and population just as important as the characteristics of the German perpetrators. Geographically, the Jews were worse off than in France and Belgium. First, they could not flee to thinly populated and forested regions where it was easier to hide, since the Netherlands was heavily populated and lacked forests; second, escape over a “friendly” border was more difficult since the Netherlands was surrounded by Germany, occupied Belgium, and the sea.<sup>5</sup> Blom suggests that the relative lack of prewar anti-semitism in the Netherlands might have given the Jewish inhabitants a false sense of

security.<sup>6</sup> The segmentation of Dutch society<sup>7</sup> along denominational lines could also have played a role, since that might have made the isolation of the Jews prior to their deportation seem more acceptable to the Dutch.<sup>8</sup> On the whole, the Dutch reacted to the German occupation, including the persecution of the Jews, with a high degree of cooperation, following their reputed tradition of deference to authority. This did not change when the deportations started, and it lasted until the beginning of 1943, when Germany's prospects for winning the war appeared to be fading after the Battle of Stalingrad.<sup>9</sup> The Belgians seem to have been more resistant to the persecution of the Jews generally, while the Vichy regime in France resisted the persecution of native-born French Jews, but cooperated in the persecution of immigrants (both naturalized and non-naturalized). Resistance to the German occupation in these countries was organized earlier than in the Netherlands.<sup>10</sup>

However, Blom's analysis does not count these factors decisive in the low survival rate of Jews in the Netherlands. Instead, he emphasizes the quality, effectiveness, thoroughness, and efficiency of the Dutch bureaucracy.<sup>11</sup> The almost complete registration of the civilian population and the hard-to-forge Dutch identity cards were the most important factors in this context. In Belgium and France there existed a tradition of opposition to or evasion of government authority—resulting in less-efficient types of population registration. In the Netherlands, by contrast, there was for a long time little doubt that the bureaucracy would not sabotage German-imposed measures, and in fact these were thoroughly implemented.

The third and final area of analysis—the behavior of the victims—seems in my reading of Blom the least important in explaining the survival rate. However, he still suggests cautiously that the docility of the Jewish Council in the Netherlands might have played a role.<sup>12</sup> On the background characteristics of the Jews, Blom's analysis becomes so cautious that clarity seems to suffer. For instance he supposes that, in contrast to France, foreign Jews in the Netherlands might have survived at a higher rate than Dutch Jews.<sup>13</sup> But why Blom believes this should have been the case remains ambiguous.

Moore

In the book he published eight years after Blom's article, Moore<sup>14</sup> puts forward several potential explanations of why foreign Jews, especially German ones, might have been less vulnerable than Dutch Jews. First, most of the Jews who came from Germany knew what to expect of a German occupation, which made it likely that they acted sooner than Dutch Jews to save themselves.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, German Jews held key positions within the Jewish Council in Amsterdam and the Jewish administration in the transit camp (Judendurchgangslager) of Westerbork, so they were able to postpone the deportation of their compatriots and thereby increase the latter's survival rate.<sup>16</sup>

Moore's other explanations expand upon Blom's to a large extent. Moore deals first with the survivors: the Jews who were exempted from deportation until the end

of the war, the Jews who fled abroad, and the Jews who hid themselves. According to Moore, 25,000 Jews went underground. Although about 10,000 of them were caught, those in hiding were still the single largest group of survivors. Even so, most Jews did not hide, and “the majority did not even make the attempt.”<sup>17</sup> This was not just for practical reasons, such as having to look after parents and children, but also because of “the deference to authority felt by the majority of Jews in the Netherlands.”<sup>18</sup> Many others simply lacked the money or could not find a safe place to hide. The Dutch-organized resistance came into being only at a later stage during the war, after most of the Jews had been deported.<sup>19</sup>

For other factors influencing the low survival rate, Moore essentially repeats Blom’s explanations. Dutch geography made it more difficult to flee or hide; the SS and antisemitic Austrians in the German civil administration were influential; the Germans effectively carried out the persecution; the Dutch bureaucracy assisted the Germans, primarily through population registration; the Dutch police helped and Dutch bounty hunters, lured by blood money, tracked down Jews in hiding.<sup>20</sup>

Griffioen and Zeller

Griffioen and Zeller<sup>21</sup> ask the same question: Why did so few Jews in the Netherlands survive? After repeating Blom’s stress on the influence of the SS at the top of the civilian administration headed by Hitler’s plenipotentiary Arthur Seyss-Inquart, they concentrate on how the deportations in the Netherlands and Belgium were organized.<sup>22</sup> The German deportation machine in the Netherlands ran much more smoothly than in Belgium, using intimidation and deception whenever and wherever possible. In Belgium the machine faltered because too much pressure was put on the Jews right from the start: the result of this was that many of the Jews were not fooled or intimidated, but instead large numbers rushed into hiding, assisted by non-Jews.<sup>23</sup> The latter helped at the appropriate time, unlike so many Dutch Gentiles.

The Resistance organizations in the Netherlands came into being starting around May 1943, when most of the Jews who would die had already been killed. According to Griffioen and Zeller, at the moment when Jews were looking for safe hideouts, food, and false identity cards, these were hard to find. Moreover, there was no large Jewish resistance organization in the Netherlands, so the Jews there concentrated on the “legal” possibilities for avoiding deportation, which in the end only postponed their fate. The Jews in Belgium did organize themselves, building on preexisting organizational networks. Thus, large numbers were already in hiding by September and October 1942. Although the total number of Jews who hid was the same in Belgium and the Netherlands (25,000), the relative number was much larger in Belgium.<sup>24</sup>

Unlike Blom and Moore, Griffioen and Zeller downplay the role of geography. But here (as in some other cases discussed below) I find their logic unconvincing. According to Griffioen and Zeller, the fact that from mid-1943 until the end of the war between 200,000 and 300,000 Dutch men trying to evade forced labor in

Germany found refuge underground shows that hiding opportunities were not primarily determined by the Dutch landscape.<sup>25</sup> However, the fact that Dutch Gentiles managed to hide does not necessarily mean that a more favorable landscape could not have improved the rate of survival of Jews who were unable to find refuge.

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Since the central question of why so few Jews from the Netherlands survived is inherently quantitative, historians have come up against a mismatch between their question and the methods used to answer them. Inevitably, the scholars mentioned base their generalizations on a limited number of observations. Just how representative these observations are remains in question. Furthermore, comparisons of the effect of supposedly influential factors in different countries can be challenged: When can one state with certainty how much various factors mattered?

A quantitative question calls for a quantitative approach relying upon primary sources. In our dissertation, Tammes and I employed such an approach. Although our study compares rates of survival only within the Netherlands, the results are relevant to broader questions. Below I will discuss our methods and most important findings, moving on after that to the implications of these findings for the debate over the low rate of Jewish survival in the Netherlands as opposed to that in other countries.

### **The Survival Rate**

To determine whether individual Jews from the Netherlands survived the Holocaust, Tammes and I used two kinds of sources: original registration lists, compiled during the occupation, and *In Memoriam*,<sup>26</sup> a book that gives personal information for those Jews who did not survive the German occupation, based on the original lists of deportees, archival materials, and additional information derived from postwar testimonies.

Almost all of the registration lists are based on the general registration of Jews in 1941. At the beginning of January of that year, Reichskommissar Seyss-Inquart ordered everyone with at least one grandparent of Jewish descent to register before February 24. As far as is known, hardly anyone refused to do so.<sup>27</sup> A total of 160,820 people registered themselves, of whom the Nazis perceived 140,001 to be Jewish, namely those with at least three grandparents of Jewish descent.<sup>28</sup>

During the registration process special forms were used to record personal information. This information was copied to catalog cards in the population register; afterward, the forms were sent to the Rijksinspectie van de Bevolkingsregisters (Inspectorate of Registries, RvB) in The Hague. Using the registration forms, the Inspectorate produced two copies of a special card catalog of Jews. One copy was assigned to the Zentralstelle für jüdische Auswanderung, the German agency responsible for the selection of the Jews to be transferred to Westerbork.<sup>29</sup> In mid-July 1942 the transport of Jews from Westerbork to the death camps started.



Elderly Jewish couple on their way from Hooghalen to the Westerbork transit camp, October 1942. Dutch constable stands behind. Photo Archives, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, courtesy of Trudi Gidan.

Although the RvB was assisted by twenty-five typists from the Jewish Council in the production of the card catalogs, the process took several months. The sheer number of Jews in Amsterdam—80,000—delayed the entire project. For the German *Sicherheitspolizei*, this was too much time: it wanted to know the extent of the “Jewish threat” in the Netherlands as soon as possible. That is why it began to instruct the Dutch municipalities province by province to hand over lists of their Jewish inhabitants. The provinces of Overijssel, Zeeland, and Zuid-Holland got this assignment as early as January 1941. In March Friesland and Noord-Holland followed, Utrecht in June, and Limburg in October 1941. However, not just the *Sicherheitspolizei* was interested in the Jews. In the province of Gelderland it was the *Devisenschutzkommando* (German currency police) that demanded lists of Jewish inhabitants in April 1941;

in Middelharnis the local German Ortskommandant demanded the lists, the first in March, and then a second one in September 1941.<sup>30</sup>

Even though the burgomasters were obliged to report to the RvB and the Sicherheitspolizei any changes in the status of those registered, the Sicherheitspolizei again instructed the municipalities to produce lists of Jewish inhabitants in 1942. The provinces of Noord-Holland and Zeeland were the first to do so, in February 1942, probably a last checkup in preparation for the forced move of Jews in these provinces to Amsterdam preparatory to their transfer to Westerbork. Zuid-Holland followed suit in May, and the rest of the country in June 1942.<sup>31</sup>

After the liberation, the new Dutch government would seem to have decided that it did not want any incriminating material in the archives. Therefore the original archival material pertaining to the registration of the Jews, including the registration forms the municipalities had sent to the RvB, was destroyed. The central authorities then instructed the municipalities at the end of April 1946 to send for destruction the population registration cards that were marked with a "J" for "Jew."<sup>32</sup>

However, most of the lists the municipalities produced for the Sicherheitspolizei or the Devisenschutzkommando in 1941 and 1942 escaped destruction because many of the municipalities kept a copy for their own records. With digitized versions of these lists and *In Memoriam*, it proved possible to establish the percentage of surviving Jews in 306 out of the total of 496 municipalities that had Jewish inhabitants as of October 1, 1941.<sup>33</sup> The number of Jews on these lists is 126,619, with an average national survival rate of 29.6 percent. Since Gerhard Hirschfeld has convincingly calculated that only 27.1 percent of the Jews from the Netherlands survived the German occupation,<sup>34</sup> this means that the survival rate that Tammes and I calculated for the municipalities is on average only 2.5 percentage points too high.<sup>35</sup> This overestimation probably reflects small variations and mistakes in the names and birthdates on the registration lists as well as in *In Memoriam*. These divergences disrupted our computerized data-linking procedure.<sup>36</sup>

Figure 1 depicts the number of Jewish inhabitants and percentage of survivors per province and gives an idea of the regional variation in both. The provinces of Drenthe, Groningen, and Noord-Holland were the most dangerous, Limburg, Utrecht, and Zeeland the least.

The largest part of our work consists of attempts to explain the differences in survival rates.<sup>37</sup> According to our research, these variations were not coincidental: there were patterns. By making use of quantitative data analysis (multivariate multilevel analysis), we were able to pinpoint the effects of several factors on the survival rate, measuring these factors at different levels of analysis: micro-level (the individual), meso-level (municipalities), and macro-level (districts of the Sicherheitspolizei). The most important results are summed up below. They cover the forty-seven municipalities that had at least one hundred Jewish inhabitants. Thus, municipalities with extreme survival rates (zero or one hundred percent) as a result of small absolute numbers are left out.

**Table 1**  
**Number of Jewish Inhabitants of Dutch Provinces and Municipalities in October 1941, Percentage of Jews Surviving the German Occupation of the Netherlands, 1940–1945<sup>a</sup>**

	Number	%		Number	%
Groningen	4,708	22.1	Friesland	852	33.8
Bedum	2	0.0	Barradeel	1	0.0
Delfzijl	139	25.0	Bolsward	1	100.0
Groningen	2,881	23.0	Dokkum	1	100.0
Haren	56	50.9	Franeker	19	63.2
Hoogezand	89	18.2	Harlingen	45	4.5
Leek	69	23.2	Heerenveen	42	30.8
Muntendam	14	21.4	Ijlst	2	100.0
Nieuwe Pekela	30	43.3	Leeuwarden	604	31.3
Oude Pekela	118	14.5	Leeuwarderadeel	28	40.0
Sappermeer	37	48.6	Lemsterland	3	66.7
Termunten	22	23.8	Ooststellingwerf	4	100.0
Veendam	107	13.7	Opsterland	18	41.2
Vlagtwedde	115	23.6	Smallingerland	22	40.9
Wildervank	122	20.7	Sneek	42	53.7
Winschoten	430	12.1	Tietjerkstradeel	3	66.7
Winsum	14	14.3	Weststellingwerf	5	80.0
			Wymbritseradeel	1	100.0
Drenthe	2,498	20.0			
Assen	427	12.9	Overijssel	4,385	43.3
Beilen	57	24.6	Almelo	399	42.9
Borger	14	0.0	Ambt Delden	3	100.0
Coevorden	143	14.0	Avereest	45	20.0
Dalen	16	18.8	Bathmen	10	0.0
Eelde	1	100.0	Blokzijl	8	37.5
Emmen	177	25.7	Borne	95	33.7
Gieten	23	4.3	Dalfsen	6	100.0
Hoogeveen	208	33.5	Den Ham	7	28.6
Meppel	250	22.0	Denekamp	53	28.3
Odoorn	12	50.0	Deventer	587	41.7
Roden	12	8.3	Diepenheim	11	9.1
Rolde	12	8.3	Diepenveen	11	54.5
Ruinen	11	9.1	Enschede	1,264	52.1
Smilde	13	15.4	Goor	32	62.5
Wijk, de	2	50.0	Haaksbergen	55	66.7
Zuidlaren	17	17.6	Hardenberg	38	13.2
Zweelo	2	0.0	Hasselt	11	36.4
			Heino	1	100.0
Noord-Brabant	2,281	48.1	Hellendoorn	22	45.5
Bergen op Zoom	44	65.9	Hengelo	312	50.3
Boxmeer	17	17.6	Holten	52	36.5
Breda	197	50.0	Kampen	39	23.1
Oss	354	31.4	Losser	20	92.3
Tilburg	326	63.9	Markelo	11	0.0
Veghel	24	33.3	Oldenzaal	66	16.9
			Olst	7	85.7
Gelderland	6,642	38.9	Ommen	54	35.2
Aalten	78	59.0	Ootmarsum	11	9.1

*continued*



**Table 1**  
**continued**

	Number	%		Number	%
Arnhem	1,810	41.6	Raalte	43	14.3
Bergh	35	37.1	Rijssen	114	14.9
Dinxperloo	82	50.6	Stad Delden	33	44.8
Ede	83	65.4	Staphorst	4	50.0
Hengelo	41	41.5	Steenwijk	93	54.9
Hummelo en Keppel	39	29.4	Steenwijkerwold	2	50.0
Nijkerk	59	27.1	Tubbergen	3	100.0
Nijmegen	523	28.9	Vollenhove	3	66.7
Rheden	90	70.9	Vriezenveen	19	73.7
Tiel	54	71.2	Weerselo	15	93.3
Winterswijk	260	19.4	Wierden	49	46.9
Wisch	68	68.8	Wijhe	4	100.0
Zutphen	492	28.5	Zwartsluis	12	16.7
			Zwolle	658	35.4
Limburg	1,441	48.8	Zwollerkerspel	10	30.0
Beek	23	66.7			
Eygelshoven	8	25.0	Utrecht	3,802	51.1
Geleen	55	36.4	Abcoude	17	41.2
Gennep	45	37.8	Achttienhoven	14	42.9
Heel en Panheel	1	100.0	Amerongen	3	66.7
Heer	31	19.4	Amersfoort	633	50.0
Heerlen	124	52.0	Baarn	119	61.3
Heythuysen	1	0.0	Breukelen	4	75.0
Kerkrade	47	53.3	Bunschoten	1	0.0
Maastricht	418	49.5	De Bilt	216	51.9
Melick en Herkenbosch	2	0.0	Doorn	71	44.3
Nieuwenhagen	11	90.9	Driebergen-Rijsenburg	95	60.6
Oirsbeek	3	100.0	Eemnes	1	100.0
Roermond	110	45.4	Houten	2	50.0
Vaals	49	44.9	Jutphaas	52	36.5
Venlo	145	55.6	Leersum	1	100.0
Weert	1	100.0	Loenersloot	1	100.0
			Loosdrecht	88	75.6
Zeeland	174	55.8	Maarn	12	100.0
Goes	8	71.4	Maarssen	4	75.0
Kapelle	11	100.0	Maarsseveen	3	0.0
Middelburg	72	55.6	Maartensdijk	184	63.4
Terneuzen	12	33.3	Mijdrecht	3	0.0
Vlissingen	38	45.9	Montfoort	3	100.0
Wolphaartsdijk	1	100.0	Oudenrijn	3	66.7
			Rhenen	10	70.0
Noord-Holland	87,566	26.6	Soest	73	59.4
Aalsmeer	2	50.0	Tienhoven	4	100.0
Alkmaar	187	35.7	Utrecht	1,908	45.9
Amsterdam	77,252	25.3	Veenendaal	22	61.9
Andijk	3	100.0	Veldhuizen	7	0.0
Anna-Pauwlowna	1	100.0	Vinkeveen en Waverveen	1	100.0
Assendelft	7	100.0	Vleuten	1	0.0
Bennebroek	11	27.3	Westbroek	16	50.0
Bergen	27	61.5	Woudenberg	1	100.0
Beverwijk	48	46.8	Zeist/Den Dolder	229	67.0

*continued*

**Table 1**  
**continued**

	Number	%		Number	%
Blaricum	120	68.1	Zuilen	68	55.9
Bovenkarspel	2	50.0			
Broek in Waterland	5	100.0	Zuid-Holland	25,648	32.4
Castricum	34	79.4	Alblasserdam	7	71.4
Den Helder	119	66.0	Alkemade	7	100.0
Diemen	68	66.7	Alphen aan de Rijn	75	26.7
Edam	26	30.8	Ameide	2	0.0
Egmond aan Zee	3	100.0	Asperen	1	100.0
Egmond Binnen	1	100.0	Bergschenhoek	5	100.0
Enkhuizen	38	76.3	Bodegraven	24	37.5
Graft	3	100.0	Boskoop	10	70.0
's-Graveland	3	100.0	Brielle	22	27.3
Grootebroek	1	100.0	Delft	148	54.4
Haarlem	1,202	46.4	Dirksland	9	22.2
Haarlemmerliede-Spaarnwoude	13	41.7	Dordrecht	297	38.9
Haarlemmermeer	48	77.1	Gorinchem	106	35.8
Heemstede	210	62.6	Gouda	199	38.9
Heerhugowaard	5	100.0	's-Gravendeel	1	100.0
Heiloo	21	66.7	's-Gravenhage	13,829	35.4
Hoogkarspel	5	100.0	Hardinxveld	4	0.0
Hoogwoud	10	50.0	Heenvliet	3	0.0
Hoorn	34	62.5	Hellevoetsluis	2	50.0
Huizen	68	54.4	Hillegom	2	50.0
Koog-aan-de-Zaan	29	50.0	Krimpen aan den IJssel	4	25.0
Kortenhoef	2	50.0	Leerdam	5	60.0
Krommenie	4	75.0	Leiden	367	51.1
Landsmeer	6	33.3	Maassluis	7	28.6
Langedijk	3	66.7	Middelharnis	37	25.0
Medemblik	7	42.9	Monster	5	0.0
Monickendam	21	23.8	Moordrecht	4	0.0
Muiden	19	89.5	Naaldwijk	5	20.0
Naarden	499	55.5	Nieuwerkerk aan den IJssel	4	25.0
Nieuwer-Amstel	349	56.5	Nieuwkoop	4	75.0
Obdam	3	100.0	Nieuwveen	4	25.0
Oostzaan	16	46.7	Noordwijk	27	38.5
Ouder-Amstel	71	46.5	Numansdorp	3	0.0
Purmerend	7	28.6	Oestgeest	47	71.7
Schagen	15	53.3	Oostvoorne	6	0.0
Schermerhorn	5	100.0	Oud-Beijerland	37	31.4
Schoorl	6	66.7	Ouddorp	1	0.0
Sint Maarten	1	100.0	Oude Tonge	7	14.3
Terschelling	3	33.3	Pijnacker	19	78.9
Texel	11	100.0	Poortugaal	29	96.6
Uitgeest	9	66.7	Reeuwijk	7	42.9
Uithoorn	15	53.3	Ridderkerk	5	40.0
Urk	3	0.0	Rotterdam	8,368	23.6
Ursem	1	100.0	Sassenheim	5	100.0
Velsen	121	51.7	Schelluinen	1	100.0
Weesp	65	20.0	Schiedam	200	33.5
Westwoud	1	100.0	Schoonhoven	15	64.3

*continued*

**Table 1**  
*continued*

	Number	%		Number	%
Westzaan	1	100.0	Schoonrewoerd	1	0.0
Wieringerwaard	4	100.0	Sliedrecht	20	10.0
Winkel	1	100.0	Sommelsdijk	10	10.0
Wormer	1	100.0	Spijkenisse	5	0.0
Wormerveer	29	34.5	Stolwijk	1	0.0
Zaandijk	12	83.3	Strijen	20	25.0
Zandvoort	506	44.4	Ter Aar	3	66.7
Zuid- en Noordschermer	1	100.0	Vianen	3	33.3
			Vlaardingen	24	45.8
			Voorburg	370	56.8
			Voorhout	3	100.0
			Voorschoten	14	50.0
			Waalwijk	25	68.0
			Waddinxveen	15	46.7
			Warmond	1	0.0
			Wassenaar	120	65.8
			Woerden	41	65.9
			Zuidland	9	0.0
			Zwammerdam	5	20.0
			Zwijndrecht	21	9.5

<sup>a</sup>Since we could calculate the percentage of survivors in only 306 out of 496 municipalities, the number of Jews in the municipalities adds up to 126,619 and not to the known total of 140,001. For details and sources see Croes and Tammes, "*Gif laten wij niet voortbestaan*," 572–77.

Limitations of time and money permitted us to examine only two factors at the individual level: age and nationality. A higher age was correlated with a higher rate of survival, but this increase was not linear: the size of the effect decreased with age. For purposes of our study, the Jews were divided into three nationality groups: Dutch, German, and other.<sup>38</sup> On the whole, the Jews of "other" nationalities experienced the highest rate of survival. In Amsterdam Jews with German nationality had the highest rate of survival, though this may be related to the role of German Jews on the Jewish Council,<sup>39</sup> but on the national level there appears to have been no difference between the Jews of Dutch and German nationality.

At the municipal level five factors significantly correlate with the survival rate of Jews. The first was the percentage of local policemen who were pro-German.<sup>40</sup> The greater this percentage, the lower the survival rate. The second factor was the percentage of Catholics. Contrary to what was expected based on the literature, the effect of this percentage was positive: Jews survived at a higher rate if relatively more Catholics lived in their municipality. This intriguing result should lead to more research at the local level. The third factor was the extent of polarization (the fragmentation of Dutch society along denominational lines).<sup>41</sup> The effect of this factor on the rate of survival was negative: a higher degree of polarization corresponded with fewer Jewish survivors. The fourth factor was the percentage of converted Jews. The positive effect of that factor on the rate of survival is not just an indication that



Figure 1. Number of Jews in October 1941 and Survival Rate by Province

converts to Christianity were more likely to survive than Jews who had not been baptized. It also means that other Jews were saved by making use of the social networks of the converts, who bridged the Jewish and Gentile worlds.<sup>42</sup> The fifth factor is the date of the start of the local deportations. Contrary to the expectation, the rate of survival decreased significantly when this start happened later. It is not immediately clear how to explain this result.

At the macro-level—the seven districts of the Sicherheitspolizei in the Netherlands—the influence of two factors was researched: the general ferocity of the seven regional bureaus, and the efforts they made to capture Jews in hiding. The rate of survival was significantly lower in the district of the most aggressive bureau than in the districts of the moderately aggressive bureaus.<sup>43</sup> However, there appears to have been no significant difference in the survival rate between the most and the

least aggressive bureaus. With regard to the efforts of the bureaus to catch hidden Jews, the district of the most active bureau was not necessarily the district with the lowest rate of survival.<sup>44</sup> Apparently, the rate was significantly lower in the districts of the moderately active bureaus than in the districts of the most active. This could indicate that the activity of the Sicherheitspolizei was concentrated precisely in those districts where the regular deportations had shown less “success.”

### **The Meaning of Variation**

The extent of the variation in the survival rate of Jews in the Netherlands means that some of the common explanations in Dutch historiography for the small number of survivors in that country can be ruled out. For example, since there was no variation in the way the Jews were registered,<sup>45</sup> the differences in municipal survival rates contradict the notion that the Jews were doomed as soon as they were registered. This is not surprising since the registration could at best make the persecution easier to execute; it did not necessarily lead to “success.”

Other explanations referring to the role of the Dutch bureaucracy in general, its executive branch, or the Dutch police, now seem doubtful. If the cooperation of the Dutch civil servants was as complete and universal as is believed, while at the same time so crucial to the low rates of survival, then why do the municipal survival rates vary? As Tammes and I show,<sup>46</sup> the National Socialists replaced many, but not all, burgomasters during the occupation. It could be assumed that the degree of cooperation was higher in municipalities where they did so and that the survival rate of Jews was lower in these municipalities. However, our analysis showed that the presence of pro-German burgomasters did not significantly affect the survival rate in their municipalities.<sup>47</sup>

In fact, given the variation in the municipal survival rates, *all* current explanations have become less tenable. These explanations are based on the mean average percentage of Jewish survival, so they presuppose two things: first and by default, that there is so little variation in the survival rate that it can safely be ignored, which appears not to be true; and second, that the explanation of the low survival rate is to be found in factors that were influential at the national level. However, it should have been an undertaking from the start to justify the focus on causes at the national level. This is not just the case with the Netherlands. As Lieven Saerens has shown,<sup>48</sup> the rate of survival of Jews in Belgium varied, too: 65 percent in Luik, 63 percent in Brussels, 58 percent in Charleroi, and just 35 percent in Antwerp. Local variations in survival rates suggest that we change the question from “Why did so few Jews survive in the Netherlands?” to “What factors influenced the chances of survival at the individual, municipal, regional, and higher levels?”

Implicitly, one could argue, some Dutch researchers already understood the importance of local variables, at least to some extent, since they concentrate on explanations that can be true only for Amsterdam. At the same time they sometimes

treat these factors as though they applied to the country as a whole. Griffioen and Zeller contend, for instance, that the system of temporary exemptions from deportation can explain the low survival rate of the Jews in the Netherlands in general. They argue that this system meant that Jews attempted to obtain exemptions instead of looking for places to hide. However, this factor can have been really influential only in Amsterdam, since few exemptions were given to Jews living outside this city. Only one-tenth of the so-called *Rüstungsjuden*, i.e., those with “*Rüstungssperre*,” temporary exemptions granted to workers needed for the German war effort, lived outside Amsterdam. Only one-third of the temporary exemptions handed out by the Jewish Council ended up outside Amsterdam. In November 1942 the Jews outside Amsterdam had to share 12,800 temporary exemptions, while the Jews in Amsterdam had about 28,800.<sup>49</sup> Starting in November 1942, however, the *Rüstungssperre* were phased out. Furthermore, half of the temporary exemptions provided by the Jewish Council were revoked before April 1943. Table 2 shows that on April 11, 1943, a total of 8,564 employees of the Council were still exempted, and with them 4,021 spouses and 3,047 children. More than 93 percent of these lived in Amsterdam.<sup>50</sup> So, while it is not unlikely that the temporary exemptions could have influenced the thinking of Jews in Amsterdam, it seems rather unlikely this played the same role for Jews outside that city. Although 57 percent of the Jews in the Netherlands lived in Amsterdam, this leaves open to discussion the generalization regarding the country-wide role of the system of temporary exemptions from deportation.

One still may well wonder how important the temporary exemptions from deportation were even for Amsterdam. Despite the availability of these temporary exemptions, many Jews in Amsterdam were already trying to survive by hiding in 1942—many more than previously has been assumed.<sup>51</sup> From September 1942 onward about half of the Jews ordered to report for transport to Westerbork refused to show up even though they knew they could be punished for this by being sent to Mauthausen, a concentration camp known to mean certain death. Furthermore, survival rates in other municipalities are low too, although temporary exemptions could

**Table 2**  
**Exempted Officials of the Jewish Council, Spouses, and Children, April 11, 1943**

Town/Province	Jewish Council			% of Total Exempted
	Employees	Partners	Children	
Amsterdam	8,000	3,800	2,750	93.1
Den Haag	312	73	148	3.4
Rotterdam	126	68	64	1.7
Utrecht (city)	42	23	31	0.6
Noord-Holland (province)	33	18	18	0.4
Zuid-Holland (province)	20	15	15	0.3
Utrecht (province)	31	24	21	0.5
Total	8,564	4,021	3,047	100.0

not have played an important role there. Griffioen and Zeller themselves cannot rule out alternative explanations for the low survival rate of the Amsterdam Jews: perhaps these Jews had more trouble finding places to hide; perhaps, as I will argue below, the persecution here was especially fierce.

### **Current Explanations Not Corroborated**

The problem is not just that some of the current explanations for the low survival rate of Jews in the Netherlands focus on one city instead of the entire country (as, for example, in discussions of the temporary exemptions). Nor is it that other explanatory factors do not vary by locality, and therefore cannot explain variation in survival rates (i.e., the almost complete registration of the Jews). Some supposedly explanatory factors that do vary among municipalities do not do so in correlation with local survival rates. This means that their influence on this survival rate should be doubted.

Take the obedience-to-authority explanation of Blom and Moore: because the Dutch were supposedly more obedient than the French and Belgians, there was less resistance against the persecutions, resulting in a lower survival rate. Tammes and I investigated whether this explanation held true at the local level, whether the municipal degree of obedience to authority correlated with differences in the local survival rate.<sup>52</sup> If it could be shown that such a mechanism existed and was at work at the local level, this would make more convincing the argument that the same mechanism played a role in differences between countries.

To assess the degree of obedience to authority, Tammes and I divided the local percentage of voters adhering to one of the Christian denominations by the percentage of votes for the political party that corresponded with this denomination, the party for which the adherents of the denomination were called upon to vote by their preachers.<sup>53</sup> Thus, to express the obedience to authority of the Catholics at the local level we divided the local percentage of Catholics in the census of 1930 by the local percentage of votes for the Catholic Party in the elections of 1939. Similarly, we divided the local percentage of Protestants by the local percentage of votes for the Protestant parties. To measure the obedience to authority of the Christians in general we divided the total local percentage of Christians by the total local percentage of votes for the confessional parties. If every Christian—Catholic or Protestant—did what he was supposed to do, what his religious leaders told him to do, all three fractions would equal one or close to one. However this is not the case. Furthermore, given that the fractions vary among municipalities, the rate of obedience to authority was not the same everywhere.

To see whether Blom's and Moore's obedience-to-authority hypothesis could be corroborated, Tammes and I tested whether there existed a statistically significant relationship between the local degree of obedience to authority and the local survival rate of Jews.<sup>54</sup> The only fraction that showed such a correlation to the survival rate

was that for the Christian community as a whole. But this correlation was the opposite of what was expected: more obedience to authority corresponded to a higher percentage of survivors instead of a lower one. Could it be that Christians who were more obedient to authority were more inclined to help the persecuted? These intriguing results raise questions regarding the obedience-to-authority hypothesis, and in particular the question of who was obedient to whom, under what conditions, and with what effects. Blom and Moore are very speculative in this regard and provide no evidence.

The researchers mentioned above believe that antisemitism can in some measure explain the difference between the Netherlands and other Western European countries in the relative number of surviving Jews. It motivated the German officials in their unrelenting attempts to make the Netherlands “Judenrein,” free of Jews.<sup>55</sup> At the same time, Blom thinks that the relative lack of antisemitism in the Dutch population might have given the Jews a false sense of security.<sup>56</sup> Building on this last idea, one would expect somewhat counter-intuitively that when the local degree of antisemitism was high, the survival rate of the Jews was high as well. Looking at the 1939 elections and using the percentage of votes cast for the Dutch National Socialist Movement (Nationaal Socialistische Beweging, NSB) as an indicator of the local rate of antisemitism, Tammes and I tested to see whether this was the case.<sup>57</sup> It was not: analysis showed that there was no statistically significant relationship between the local antisemitism rate and the local survival rate. This result makes less plausible the idea that national differences in the survival rate of Jews can be explained by the “lack” of antisemitism.

Another issue the above-mentioned researchers agree on is the relative lack of resistance in the Netherlands prior to May 1943. The result supposedly was that until that time Jews had had trouble finding places to hide and that, consequently, few of them managed to go underground. This changed following the April–May strike of 1943. After the bloody suppression of this strike a few hundred thousand Dutchmen avoiding labor conscription proved that it was relatively easy to go underground. By this time, however, most of the Jews who would not survive the German occupation had already been killed. They had needed hiding places when they were not yet available.

This line of reasoning appears often in modern Dutch historiography. All the same, there are small differences. Moore stresses that the majority of the Jews in the Netherlands did not attempt to go underground,<sup>58</sup> seemingly underlining the passivity of the Jews themselves. Griffioen and Zeller contrast the lack of resistance in the Netherlands with the situation in Belgium, where there was more organized resistance on the part of the Jews themselves and at an earlier time. Nonetheless, when it comes to the numbers involved, Griffioen and Zeller think that the number of Jews who attempted to survive in hiding in Belgium equals the number in the Netherlands, about 25,000.<sup>59</sup>



As a percentage of the population, the Belgian total is much higher than the Dutch. All the same, the absolute numbers suggest that passivity and lack of resistance in the Netherlands are stressed too much in explaining the low survival rate of the Jews. This speculation becomes more plausible when one realizes that the number of Jews who attempted to hide is an approximation based on flawed German figures.<sup>60</sup> This makes underestimation inevitable. A conservative educated guess, taking into account sources ignored until now, suggests that at least 28,000 Jews went underground.<sup>61</sup> The real number of Jews who attempted to survive in hiding was probably higher, maybe thousands higher. Furthermore, it is clear that Jews were hiding in large numbers from the start of the deportations to the destruction camps in July 1942.<sup>62</sup> The argument that Jews did not hide at a relatively early time, either because of their supposed passivity, the system of temporary exemptions from deportation, or the difficulty of finding places to hide, simply does not hold up under scrutiny.<sup>63</sup>

There is no new evidence to suggest that more Jews survived in hiding, so more Jews must have been arrested in hiding than the numbers previously given. At least 12,000 were apprehended in hiding, and there are indications that the real number could have been several thousand higher.<sup>64</sup>

### **New Explanations**

All estimates of the numbers of Jews caught in hiding depend on the quality of the registration of the so-called *Straffälle*, Jews liable for punishment for having hidden (approximately 80 percent of the cases) or for other “crimes.” This registration was performed by the Jewish administration in Westerbork and is known to have been incomplete. Until April 1943 those Jews designated as *Straffälle* sometimes were not registered as such on arrival in Westerbork. Having been warned by Jews who worked in the administration, they managed to get rid of their call-up orders or identity cards, which were marked by the “S” for *Straffall*. In April 1943 the Sicherheitspolizei revised its registration system and, instead of marking the call-up order or identity card, started to send lists of *Straffälle* to Westerbork. At the same time, quite often the regional bureau of the Sicherheitspolizei sent *Straffälle* to Westerbork without designating them as such. In Rotterdam at least 897 Jews were arrested in hiding, but according to the Westerbork registers only 285 Jews from Rotterdam arrived in Westerbork as *Straffälle* (of whom approximately 80 percent were caught in hiding). This means that in the case of Rotterdam the official numbers underestimate by more than three times the number of Jews caught while hiding.<sup>65</sup>

It is hardly likely that only the Germans in Rotterdam were sloppy when it came to registering the Jews caught in hiding, though the evidence for Rotterdam is clearest. In the case of Amsterdam, 5,094 Jews were registered in Westerbork as *Straffälle*. However, there are indications that the hunt for Jews in hiding in Amsterdam was more severe than this number implies, or than was previously appreciated. Branches of the Dutch police arrested about 6,000 Jews<sup>66</sup> in that city while the

Kolonne Henneicke, a group of fifty-four Dutch Nazis who hunted down Jews for blood money, caught about 8,370.<sup>67</sup> Some of this total of 14,370 Jews would have ended up among and been counted as part of the 5,094 *Straffälle*, but it is clear that this cannot have been the case with all of them. So what did happen?

To the Germans, it did not matter whether the Jews were in hiding or not—they were condemned to death anyway. But German officials wanted as many Jews as possible to believe they risked severe punishment if caught in hiding so that they would not go underground. To obtain this result it was not necessary to have a complete register of the Jews caught in hiding. While it is known that at least some of the Jews whom Wim (Willem) Henneicke and his colleagues arrested were in hiding, the Germans usually did not register them as *Straffälle*. It is not known in how many cases they did or did not do so. It is also not known how many of the 6,000 Jews the Dutch police captured in Amsterdam were in hiding and how many of them were registered as *Straffälle*.<sup>68</sup>

The number of Jews who survived the German occupation in hiding is estimated to have been 16,100.<sup>69</sup> At a minimum around 12,000 Jews were apprehended in hiding.<sup>70</sup> Consequently, the *Sicherheitspolizei* and its Dutch allies were more successful in hunting down Jews than previously was appreciated. Comparison with the Belgian case is illustrative. As with the Netherlands, there are no definite figures on the number of Jews caught in hiding in Belgium. However, a rough literature-based approximation is possible. After the violent raids in September and October 1942, most of the remaining Jews in Belgium—30,000 out of a total of 40,000—went into hiding.<sup>71</sup> If it is assumed that all the Jews deported during 1943 and 1944 were caught in hiding—that is, apart from the 1,114 previously exempted Jews who for the most part were rounded up in September 1943<sup>72</sup>—the maximum number of arrested hidden Jews is 7,740. To this, we have to add the 500 arrested hidden Jews who were going to be deported but were saved because of the turmoil during the last days of the occupation of Belgium.<sup>73</sup> So the number of Jews arrested in hiding in Belgium was at most 8,240. Compared with the minimum number of 12,000 arrested in the Netherlands out of a population of Jews in hiding that was approximately of the same size, this gives an idea of the differences in the “success” of the *Sicherheitspolizei* in both countries.<sup>74</sup>

Success in the hunt for hidden Jews in the Netherlands hypothetically depended on at least three things: the efforts of the perpetrators, the help of the Dutch population, and, perhaps, the efforts of the Jews to remain unnoticed. To start with the last factor: without testimony by substantial numbers of Jews who were caught, it is hard to generalize about the mechanisms that conduced toward or against success in hiding. But the relatively high survival rate of foreign Jews in Belgium suggests that German Jews in the Netherlands might have survived disproportionately. German Jews outside Germany knew what they had fled, and perhaps they took more or better measures to save themselves.<sup>75</sup>

In Belgium the German Jews certainly did. They were organized by 1942 and established links with the Belgian resistance.<sup>76</sup> It would not seem unlikely that the behavior of German Jews in the Netherlands followed the same pattern and that they subsequently had a higher survival rate than the Dutch Jews. However, apart from Amsterdam, with its special circumstance of having many German Jews on the Jewish Council—people who may have positively influenced the chances of survival of their compatriots<sup>77</sup>—in fact, German Jews in the Netherlands were not more likely to survive than Dutch Jews.<sup>78</sup> We have no definitive answer to the question of the extent to which the hidden Jews themselves could influence their chances of survival. But if one accepts the notion that (drawing upon the Belgian case) German Jews had a greater likelihood of survival, then one would also have to deal with the fact that this apparently was not the case in the greater part of the Netherlands. Future research might throw more light on this subject.

The second factor, the betrayal of Jews by Dutch Gentiles, is probably even harder to research. While it is clear that betrayal was common, its scale and the extent of its role remain unknown. It is generally assumed that betrayers usually acted on National Socialist and antisemitic motives.<sup>79</sup> This assumption would imply that fewer Jews would survive in municipalities with more antisemites. Since the NSB was an explicitly antisemitic movement at least since 1937,<sup>80</sup> it appears reasonable to expect that a higher percentage of votes for the NSB in any place during the elections of 1939<sup>81</sup> correlates with a lower percentage of Jewish survivors.<sup>82</sup> However, as we noted above, this proved not to be the case: statistically speaking, there was no relationship between the local percentage of votes for the NSB and the local survival rate.<sup>83</sup> This could be read as an indication that the motives for betrayal might have included things other than antisemitism. Betrayals reflected various motives, the most important of which may have been to hurt the people who were hiding the Jews.<sup>84</sup> Future research might clarify this matter too.

The third factor is the efforts of the Sicherheitspolizei and its allies. It is clear that the regional Sicherheitspolizei bureaus in the Netherlands differed in their efforts to capture Jews in hiding. According to the registers in the Westerbork archive, the bureau in Maastricht was responsible for the arrest of fifty-two Jews from April 1943 to the liberation. This includes Jews, arrested by the Dutch police, who were handed over to the Germans. Compared to the 5,094 *Straffälle* the Amsterdam bureau is known to have sent to Westerbork during the same interval (including Jews arrested by the Dutch police and the *Kolonnen Henneicke*), this number appears small. And in fact, when the size of the Jewish population under both bureaus is taken into account, the success of the Amsterdam bureau is still ten times greater than Maastricht's.<sup>85</sup> As mentioned before, for the whole of the Netherlands, there are indications that the "success" rate of the seven regional bureaus of the Sicherheitspolizei was correlated with the rate of survival that Jews experienced, more "success" meaning fewer survivors.<sup>86</sup>

Tammes and I have shown that in the province of Overijssel Jews living in municipalities with a higher level of resistance had a lower rate of survival.<sup>87</sup> This result appears counter-intuitive, but was likely an unintended consequence of the methods of the *Sicherheitspolizei*, whose primary task in the Netherlands was to fight the resistance. The *Sicherheitspolizei* focused on the regions where resistance networks were the most active. It seems likely that the *Sicherheitspolizei* was thus drawn to locations where Jews were being hidden. However, for this line of reasoning to be true we have to assume that the Jews hid in the municipalities where they were registered; otherwise, the local level of resistance and the local survival rate of Jews could not be correlated. It is, however, unknown to what extent Jews hid locally, but the fact that local factors such as the composition of social networks influenced the survival rates of Jews (see above) suggests that most Jews did hide in their municipalities. At the same time, there is an alternative explanation. The high level of resistance could be a reaction to a relatively high degree of local persecution of the Jews earlier. More research would be needed to clarify this matter.

Two additional indicators suggest that the *Sicherheitspolizei* played a significant role in the rate of Jewish survival. The surviving records of the *Sicherheitspolizei* do not give clear statements of the numbers of Dutch Gentiles arrested for helping Jews in hiding, but they do give some clues. A reinterpretation of known statistics results in the estimation that on May 9, 1943, 1,604 Gentiles<sup>88</sup> were incarcerated for helping Jews. This amounted to 30 percent of all the Dutch Gentiles held in “protective custody” at that time, not a small proportion (usually, if Gentiles who helped Jews were punished, they were punished with short-term *Schutzhaft*, or protective custody; only severe cases were sent to concentration camps in Germany). Slightly more than a year later, the number had increased to 1,997 Gentiles,<sup>89</sup> 20 percent of the total number at that time.<sup>90</sup> Although these statistics are not conclusive, they still suggest the extent of help given to Jews as well as that of the *Sicherheitspolizei*’s retaliation.<sup>91</sup>

A third indication of the *Sicherheitspolizei*’s importance is the relatively high rate of survival in the province of Utrecht, where it played a very limited role in the hunt for Jews in hiding, at least until 1944.<sup>92</sup> The bulk of the task of catching Jews in hiding in the province of Utrecht during the occupation fell to the Dutch police or, to be more precise: to a special branch of the Utrecht detective force. The detectives involved were only loosely supervised, and this enabled them to act as they thought fit. This, for instance, meant that many Jews went unharmed, with or without payment to the detectives.<sup>93</sup> The hunt for Jews in hiding in the province of Utrecht caught on rather late. It appears that this delay contributed to the high rate of survival there.

Although Dutch historiography sometimes gives the impression that the history of the persecution of the Jews during the Second World War has been written, many questions are still open and deserve to be answered. This is especially true regarding the history of the Jews who went into hiding but tragically failed to survive.

## Conclusion

The extent of the local variation in the survival rate of Jews during the Holocaust in the Netherlands suggests that explanations of national differences in survival rates cannot remain limited to the national level of analysis. Since local survival rates varied widely, some of the most common explanations of the low survival rate for the Netherlands as a whole cannot be true. This is, for instance, the case with the almost complete registration of the Jews in this country.

This article similarly casts doubt on the “deference-to-authority” hypothesis, which holds that the Dutch bureaucracy and population by and large cooperated with the occupiers out of obedience. Our research shows that the local degree of obedience to authority is not correlated with the local Jewish survival rate. The idea that the low survival rate of the Jews was the result of a lack of resistance on the part of the Jews themselves, as well as on the part of the Gentiles, has to be revised too. This notion is based on German figures pertaining to Jews arrested while they were in hiding. These German figures are flawed; using them uncritically results in underestimation of the number of Jews who hid but in the end did not survive.

A likely candidate for the explanation of the high victimization rate in the Netherlands is the ferocious hunt for Jews in hiding in some parts of this country. Until now, this cause has been little studied. The present article makes clear that it deserves more attention.

## Acknowledgements

Correspondence to M.Croes@dworkin.nl. I thank the two reviewers and Michael Gelb of the Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies for their comments, which helped improve the article.

## Notes

1. The most important work on this topic has been done by historians Johan Cornelis Hendrik Blom, “The Persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands: A Comparative Western European Perspective,” *European History Quarterly* 19 (1989): 333–51; Bob Moore, *Victims and Survivors: The Nazi Persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands, 1940–1945* (London: Arnold, 1997); and Pim Griffioen and Ron Zeller, “A Comparative Analysis of the Persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands and Belgium during the Second World War,” *Netherlands’ Journal of Social Sciences* 34, no. 2 (1998): 126–64.
2. Marnix Croes and Peter Tammes, “*Gif laten wij niet voortbestaan*”: Een onderzoek naar de overlevingskansen van joden in de Nederlandse gemeenten, 1940–1945 (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2004), [http://webdoc.ubn.kun.nl/mono/c/croes\\_m/gif\\_lawin.pdf](http://webdoc.ubn.kun.nl/mono/c/croes_m/gif_lawin.pdf). Summary in English, 593–608.
3. Blom, “The Persecution of the Jews,” 335.
4. *Ibid.*, 338.
5. *Ibid.*, 341.
6. *Ibid.*, 342.

7. Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).
8. Blom, "The Persecution of the Jews," 344–46.
9. *Ibid.*, 342.
10. *Ibid.*, 342–43.
11. *Ibid.*, 343.
12. *Ibid.*, 347–48.
13. *Ibid.*, 347.
14. Moore, *Victims and Survivors*.
15. *Ibid.*, 215.
16. *Ibid.*, 217ff.
17. *Ibid.*, 151.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*, 172.
20. *Ibid.*, 190ff.
21. Griffioen and Zeller, "A Comparative Analysis."
22. *Ibid.*, 131ff.
23. *Ibid.*, 134–36.
24. *Ibid.*, 140–43.
25. *Ibid.*, 141.
26. Oorlogsgravenstichting, *In Memoriam-Lezecher* (The Hague: SDU, 1995). This book is a compilation of the memorial books of the Oorlogsgravenstichting pertaining to Jews.
27. Louis de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969–94, in fourteen parts), pt. 4 (1972), 874–75.
28. People who had two grandparents of Jewish descent were also considered Jews if they were married to a Jew or when they belonged to a Jewish congregation.
29. Croes and Tammes, "*Gif laten wij niet voortbestaan*," 126–29.
30. Marnix Croes and Peter Tammes, "De locale percentages overlevenden van de jodenvervolgung in Nederland," *Groniek* 167 (2005); Croes and Tammes, "*Gif laten wij niet voortbestaan*," 33.
31. Croes and Tammes, "*Gif laten wij niet voortbestaan*," 33–34.
32. Circular (26-4-1946) of the RvB. Tresoar, Archive of the Commissaris der Koningin in Friesland file 469.
33. Croes and Tammes, "*Gif laten wij niet voortbestaan*," 39–41, 572–77.

34. Gerhard Hirschfeld, "Niederlande" in *Dimension des Völkermords. Die Zahl der jüdischen Opfer des Nationalsozialismus*, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1991), 137–66, here 165.

35. Croes and Tammes, "Giflaten wij niet voortbestaan," 42.

36. We used the first two characters of the first name and family name, and sometimes of the maiden name, as well as the date of birth, to check whether individuals mentioned in the registration lists appeared in *In Memoriam* as well. Whenever we had a match this meant that the individual had been killed. However, one mistake in either the date of birth or the first two characters of one of the names in one of the databases was enough to prevent a match and cause the mistaken conclusion that the individual had survived.

37. Croes and Tammes, "Giflaten wij niet voortbestaan," 65–534.

38. Of the 140,001 Jews in the Netherlands, almost 118,500 had Dutch citizenship, about 14,500 German, and approximately 7,300 some other.

39. Moore, *Victims and Survivors*, 216–17.

40. To measure the local percentage of pro-German policemen, we relied on the number of policemen fired after the war because of their behavior or attitude during the war. Historians sometimes question the reliability of these figures. The extent of the purge is supposed to have reflected the inclinations of local purge committees. However, these historians often overlook various details: complaints by members of the public could start investigations; policemen who were prosecuted or who were members of a National Socialist organization were automatically fired; and the fact that the Ministry of Justice supervised and centralized the purge process and took a uniform approach. Whenever it was thought necessary, the research of the local committees was augmented and improved. Researchers have supposed the purge was flawed in two municipalities in particular: Amsterdam (Guus Meershoek, *Dienaren van het gezag: De Amsterdamse politie tijdens de bezetting* [Amsterdam: Van Genneep, 1999], 355–59); and Utrecht (Arnold Vermooij, *Grenzen aan gehoorzaamheid: Houding en gedrag van de Utrechtse politie tijdens de Duitse bezetting* [Utrecht: Trezor, 1985], 127–31). However, the origin of the numbers on which this supposition is based remains unclear. Anyway, these numbers are not derived from the original purge files, which paint a rather different picture (Croes and Tammes, "Giflaten wij niet voortbestaan," 350–55). Contrary to what has been asserted, the numerical results of the purge of the police in Amsterdam and Utrecht do not stand out from other municipalities. Furthermore, the purge results do not give the impression of leniency. See Marnix Croes, "The Dutch Police and the Persecution of Jews in the Netherlands during the German Occupation, 1940–1945" in *Local Government in Occupied Europe (1939–1945)*, ed. Bruno de Wever, Herman van Goethem, and Nico Wouters (Gent: Academia Press, 2006), 67–82.

41. To measure the degree of polarization, the extent to which Gentile men married females belonging to another denomination was used (Croes and Tammes, "Giflaten wij niet voortbestaan," 418–19).

42. *Ibid.*, 412.

43. Most violent bureau: Groningen (responsible for the provinces of Groningen, Friesland, and Drenthe). Moderately violent bureaus: Amsterdam (responsible for the provinces of Noord-Holland and Utrecht); The Hague (responsible for The Hague and its surroundings); and Rotterdam (responsible for the province of Zuid-Holland excluding The Hague and surroundings).

Least violent bureaus: Arnhem (responsible for the provinces of Gelderland and Overijssel); 's-Hertogenbosch (responsible for the provinces of Noord-Brabant and Zeeland); and Maastricht (responsible for the province of Limburg).

44. Most aggressive bureaus: Amsterdam and The Hague. Moderately aggressive bureaus: Arnhem; 's-Hertogenbosch; Groningen; and Rotterdam. Least aggressive bureau: Maastricht.

45. Peter Tammes, "Nederlandse burgemeesters en de vervolging van joden," in *Wat toeval leek te zijn, maar niet was: De organisatie van de jodenvervolging in Nederland*, ed. Henk Flap and Marnix Croes (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 2001), 69–94.

46. Croes and Tammes, "Gif laten wij niet voortbestaan," 288–90.

47. *Ibid.*, 518.

48. Lieven Saerens, *Vreemdelingen in een wereldstad: Een geschiedenis van Antwerpen en zijn joodse bevolking (1880–1944)* (Tielt: Lannoo, 2000), 648.

49. Johannes Houwink ten Cate, "Het jongere deel: Demografische en sociale kenmerken van het jodendom in Nederland tijdens de vervolging," in *Oorlogsdocumentatie '40/'45: Jaarboek van het Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie*, ed. David Barnouw, Dick van Galen Last, and Johannes Houwink ten Cate (Zutphen: Walberg Pers 1989), 9–66.

50. Marnix Croes, "Jodenvervolging in Utrecht," in Flap and Croes, *Wat toeval leek te zijn, maar niet was*, 39–68; D. Cohen to the *Zentralstelle für jüdische Auswanderung (11–4-1943)* Netherlands Institute on War Documentation (hereafter NIOD), 182:6, folder B.

51. Croes and Tammes, "Gif laten wij niet voortbestaan," 173–96. Marnix Croes, "The Netherlands 1942–1945: Survival in Hiding and the Hunt for Hidden Jews," *Netherlands' Journal of Social Sciences* 40, no. 2 (2004): 157–75.

52. Croes and Tammes, "Gif laten wij niet voortbestaan," 398–403.

53. Called "political orthodoxy," this measure is also used in political science. One might argue that obedience to authority could be measured better in a different way. But if that is so, one might wonder why Blom and Moore eschew measurement and measuring.

54. Croes and Tammes, "Gif laten wij niet voortbestaan," 403.

55. However not every German official was unrelenting. Regarding the Sicherheitspolizei, the bureaus differed widely in their relentlessness. *Ibid.*, 140–260.

56. Blom, "Persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands," 342.

57. Croes and Tammes, "Gif laten wij niet voortbestaan," 369–70, 511ff.

58. Moore, *Victims and Survivors*, 151.

59. Griffioen and Zeller, "A Comparative Analysis," 140–44.

60. Croes, "The Netherlands 1942–1945."

61. *Ibid.*

62. *Ibid.*, 159–61.



63. It should be stressed that Jews were less passive than they sometimes are made to appear. Large numbers, for instance, refused to show up for transport to Westerbork, knowing well that they risked death by disobeying and forcing the Germans to seek them at their homes instead.
64. Croes, "The Netherlands 1942–1945."
65. Ibid.
66. Official report of 20–12-1949, Ministry of Justice (MvJ), Centraal Archief Bijzondere Rechtspleging (CABR, currently located in the National Archive), file 65229.
67. *Bericht* 9–6-1943, MvJ, CABR, file 25135, and official report of 22–3-1948, MvJ, CABR, file 65229.
68. Croes and Tammes, "*Gif laten wij niet voortbestaan*," 176–96.
69. Houwink ten Cate, "Het jongere deel," 125.
70. Croes and Tammes, "*Gif laten wij niet voortbestaan*," 195.
71. Maxime Steinberg, *Le dossier Bruxelles-Auschwitz: La police SS et l'extermination des Juifs de Belgique* (Brussels: Le Comité, 1980), 149.
72. Maxime Steinberg, *L'étoile et le fusil: La traque des Juifs, 1942–1944* (two vols.) (Brussels: Vie ouvrière, 1986), vol. 2, 222ff.
73. Maxime Steinberg, *Uitroeiing, redding en verzet van de joden in België* (Brussels: Huldecomité van de Joden van België aan hun helden en redders, 1979), 21.
74. Cf. Jozef Michman, "Historical Introduction," in *The Encyclopedia of the Righteous among the Nations: Rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust: The Netherlands*, ed. Jozef Michman and Bert-Jan Flim (two vols.) (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2004), vol. 1, xviii–xxix.
75. Cf. Marjolein J. Schenkel, *De Twentse paradox: De lotgevallen van de joodse bevolking van Hengelo en Enschede tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog* (Zutphen: Walberg Pers, 2003), 137.
76. Griffioen and Zeller, "A Comparative Analysis." This is also true for the Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe in Belgium.
77. Moore, *Victims and Survivors*, 217ff.
78. Croes and Tammes, "*Gif laten wij niet voortbestaan*," 516–25.
79. Some evidence does seem to support this assumption, but the extent to which such motivation was at work remains unknown.
80. Ronald Havenaar, *De NSB tussen nationalisme en 'volkse' solidariteit: De vooroorlogse ideologie van de Nationaal Socialistische Beweging in Nederland* (The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij, 1983).
81. Unpublished election results, Central Bureau of Statistics.
82. This is not to say that all people who voted for the NSB in 1939 were antisemites, but that antisemites were more likely to vote for the NSB than for other parties. The radicalization of the NSB, which made it into an explicitly antisemitic movement, cost it half its votes in the

1937 and 1939 elections compared to 1935. See Havenaar, *De NSB tussen nationalisme en 'volkse' solidariteit*.

83. Croes and Tammes, "Giflaten wij niet voortbestaan," 516–25.

84. Croes, "Jodenvervolging in Utrecht."

85. Croes and Tammes, "Giflaten wij niet voortbestaan," 196–204.

86. *Ibid.*, 516–25. This might appear to be a truism, but it should be noted that many other factors played a positive or negative role and that the overall probability of survival combines all. It deserves special emphasis that the persecution consisted of two parallel processes: the deportation of the Jews who did not go into hiding, and the hunt for those who did. These processes influenced each other, and Jews and Gentiles reacted in myriad ways to both. This is the theory of Schenkel, *De Twentse paradox*, 141. She believes that as a result of some early roundups in the eastern part of the Netherlands in 1941 both Jews and Gentiles took more and earlier counter-measures, resulting in a relatively higher survival rate there.

87. Croes and Tammes, "Giflaten wij niet voortbestaan," 441–45.

88. *Meldungen aus den Niederlanden* 143 (9–5-1943), NIOD, 77–85: 37B.

89. *Ibid.*, 18 (13–8-1944), NIOD, 77–85: 37B.

90. Croes and Tammes, "Giflaten wij niet voortbestaan," 195. The relative decline in the proportion should be seen against the background of increasing resistance as the Allied armies approached.

91. In this context one should bear in mind that the numbers of people this article cites as having been arrested for helping Jews probably do not include people who did no more than house Jewish fugitives. It appears that often one had to do more than that to be incarcerated.

92. Croes, "Jodenvervolging in Utrecht"; Marnix Croes, "Jodenjacht in de provincie Utrecht," *Oud-Utrecht* 1 (2004): 12–18.

93. *Ibid.*